Parliamentary entry on the national level is a crucial achievement for any new party. But its repercussions are not necessarily beneficial. This paper assesses the electoral consequences of parliamentary breakthrough by theorizing factors that shape a) a new party organization's capacity to cope with pressures generated by parliamentary entry and b) the relative intensity of the new functional pressures a new party is exposed to after breakthrough. To test our hypotheses derived from these two rationales, we apply multilevel analyses to a new dataset covering 135 organizationally new parties that entered national parliament across 17 advanced democracies over nearly five decades . Our findings stress the importance of party organizational characteristics (party origin, time for party building and leadership continuity) for parties' capacity to sustain electoral support after breakthrough. In contrast, the intensity of functional pressures as generated by government participation immediately after breakthrough does not have significant effects on parties' performance at the follow-up election.
their big breakthrough and why. As earlier research suggests that structural explanations such as institutional and sociological conditions seem not very helpful to account for short-term electoral effects (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 577-8) , we propose -mainly building on Harmel and Svåsand (1993) -a party-centred perspective on new party performance instead (see also Bolleyer 2008; de Lange and Art 2011) . We theorize factors that shape a) a new party organization's capacity to cope with new demands related to parliamentary entry (e.g. leadership continuity vs. leadership change) and b) the relative intensity of these demands (e.g. parliamentary vs. government participation).
We test the hypotheses derived from these two contrasting rationales using a new dataset encompassing 135 organizationally new parties that won a seat in their national parliament at least once (irrespective of vote share or programmatic profile) across 17 advanced democracies . Applying multilevel analyses, our findings stress the importance of new parties' own characteristics rather than the intensity of institutionally generated pressures. We find significant and robust effects of the time the party had to build up its organization prior to its breakthrough and the nature of its origin on the electoral costs of parliamentary breakthrough as well as significant effects of the continuity of its leadershipwith the latter not being robust in all democracies studied though. In part this complements recent findings indicating the importance of party origin to other dimensions of new party success (e.g. party organizational survival) (Bolleyer 2013: 84; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013; Beyens et al 2015) than the one we examine here. More importantly, the relevance of the timing of breakthrough and of leadership continuity for the electoral costs of parliamentary breakthrough has -to our knowledge -not been examined in any large-N study. We conclude by discussing avenues for future research.
I. A Party-centred Perspective on New Parties after Breakthrough

I.1 New Parties' Capacity to Cope with Public Office
While parliamentary entry is likely to create some strains in any new party, the capacity of new parties to cope with this challenge is likely to vary with the newcomers' capacity to operate effectively in parliament. While much of the literature has been preoccupied with new entries' 'ideological newness' and how their profiles affect their chances of survival or their level of success (e.g. Lucardie 2000; Abedi 2004; Megiud 2007) , comparative work on party persistence and decline as well as case study research urges us to consider how parties as organizational actors operate when confronted with new challenges (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Rose and Mackie 1998; Deschouwer 2008; Mudde 2007; Art 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012) . We theorize four factors reflecting this rationale.
Building an organization able to sustain itself in face of (often conflicting) internal and external demands takes time. Simultaneously, Harmel and Svåsand have stressed (1993) that new parties often face the challenge that different stages of their development (each of which generating distinct demands) are squeezed in a short period of time. Once a party enters parliament, they argue, the attention of leading actors tends to shift from building and managing their party organization and consolidating a support base to their new responsibilities as parliamentarians (if they join government even as ministers). This shifting of priorities is naturally more problematic early in a party's life cycle. If a party enters parliament right after its formation, party founders or leaders might simply not have had the time to build a viable extra-parliamentary infrastructure able to keep followers' loyal, not to speak of the formation of a fully institutionalized party organization in which party followers and representatives consider the survival of the party as an end in itself (Panebianco 1988; de Lange and Art 2011) . We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
H1:
The earlier after their foundation new parties enter national parliament, the more votes they lose at the follow-up election.
Classical studies on party development in Western democracies have long argued that any party's organizational development is shaped by its origin (Duverger 1981; Panebianco 1988) . Recent work by Bolleyer has distinguished parties formed by individual entrepreneurs from party formations that are promoted by existing societal organizations and stressed this distinction's importance for new parties ' organizational survival (2013: 39-41; 84) . The basic argument goes that thanks to followers' already established group affiliation, they are inclined to identify with the party and are less likely to defect, even when at times disappointed by their party. If this rationale holds, it has implications for the relative costs of parliamentary breakthrough: rooted parties should be more able to cope with their first parliamentary entry and limit potential electoral losses in case of weak performance than entrepreneurial parties. At the same time, ties to promoter organizations can serve as a recruitment pool for possible party personnel already used to operate in organizational contexts and willing to prioritize the interests of the party rather than their own (Art 2011) . If elected to parliament those might find it easier to adapt to the demands of operating as part of a parliamentary group, improving the likelihood of a decent performance of rooted formations during their first term. 
H2:
Entrepreneurial new parties lose more votes at the election following their parliamentary breakthrough than rooted new parties. 3 The rooted-entrepreneurial distinction is more suitable for our purposes than the distinction between 'newly born party' (built from scratch) and 'split' or 'splinter' (formed by a defector or out of a faction of another party) (e.g. Mair 1999; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008; Beyens et al 2015) . The group of 'newly born formation' cross-cuts the distinction between entrepreneurial and rooted party (as newly borns can have the support of promoter organizations or not), while the 'splinter category' includes defecting MPs founding their own (often one man) party as well as parties built on (external) factions from established party organizations, some of which can rely on organizational resources. Such intra-group diversity means that the status of being a splinter as compared to being newly born does not generate clear-cut theoretical expectations regarding which origin is associated with which (dis)advantages (e.g. a recruitment pool for personnel, loyal supporters) regarding party's parliamentary performance.
While the loyal support from promoter organizations and time for party building are expected to facilitate institutionalization (i.e. a party's organizational consolidation), the ability to cope with leadership turnover is generally considered a critical test whether a party as organization has truly institutionalized (Janda 1980: 19) . If organizationally new parties have not yet fully consolidated when entering parliament for the first time, leadership skills but also leadership continuity can be considered crucial to keep the organization together (Pauwels 2014: 66; Mudde 2007) . Whether parties are new or well established, leadership changes are generally considered destabilizing events (Harmel et al 1995: 5; see also Bynander and 't Hart 2008) .
Parties have little incentive to replace a leader who successfully pursues its goals (EnnserJedenastik and Müller 2015: 932) , which holds all the more for a new party as "few visible actions are taken for it by other than its leader" (Harmel and Svåsand 1993: 72) . This leader (often taking over one of the party's first seats or its only seat) shapes the party's communication with the public as its most visible spokesperson. If the leader embodying a party that just experienced its' probably biggest ever success (i.e. winning its first national seats) is replaced or leaves during the party's first parliamentary term -deliberately (i.e. as result of or regulated by party procedure 4 ) or involuntary (i.e. an expression of crisis) -we expect negative effects on the party's electoral performance at the next election. When electoral loyalties are still fluid, many voters are likely to connect to a new party solely or predominantly through the particular personality of the leader (which differs from active members who also know the organization and its programme). As Litton argued recently, the change of a party's leader can be assumed to be more crucial for its public recognition than change, for instance, of its programme since "for the most part, voters are not knowledgeable, interested or equipped to understand political information in general" (2015: 714).
Consequently, particularly in regards to not very well known new parties, discontinuity in this central identification figure opens up the possibility that those followers reorient themselves away from the newcomer towards one of its competitors. Taking all this together, we expect the repercussions of leadership discontinuity during a party's first ever term in parliament to be negative.
H3:
Those parties whose leaders stay in charge after parliamentary breakthrough until the next election lose fewer votes than parties which experience leadership discontinuity in that period. 
I.2 The Demands of Parliament vs. the Demands of Government
While the demands that parliamentary politics impose on parties (e.g. the intensified need to recruit competent representatives, to assure effective intra-party coordination, to cope with media scrutiny) are similar across the range of advanced democracies, performance pressure is widely considered to be more intense when parties take over government responsibility visible in the take-over of own ministries. While government participation can mean access to valuable resources (e.g. through patronage), this move is mostly considered as detrimental for a new party. Government participation creates the risk of strong negative incumbency effects.
Parties holding ministries have policy influence which raises voter expectations towards what
the party is likely to deliver (Rose and Mackie 1983) . With very few exceptions, new parties in advanced democracies play the role of the junior partner and minor parties usually find it difficult to shape government policy and implement core preferences against the resistance of their bigger partners and are consequently often punished by the electorate (e.g. O'Malley 2011). Furthermore, new parties often find it difficult to cope with their new responsibilities professionally, e.g. to assure internal communication and, more specifically, regulate conflicts between its representatives in public office and its extra-parliamentary base (Bolleyer 2008) . Finally, new parties often enter parliament with strong anti-establishment credentials with the help of a protest vote (Abedi 2004 ). While they can maintain this image after breakthrough by playing the role of a principled opposition party in parliament, they face a considerable risk to alienate followers and thus to deteriorate their support base when being seen to actively collaborate with established elites in government (Heinisch 2003; McDonnell and Newell 2011) . While this is not to say that government responsibility does not offer benefits (such as prestige, influential parliamentary posts, ministerial resources or policy influence) new parties often find it difficult to exploit these benefits, an observation leading to our final hypothesis:
H5: New parties that take over government responsibility lose more votes at the election following their parliamentary breakthrough than new parties that stay in opposition.
II. Data and Measurement
II.1 Defining and Specifying New Parties
Following Bolleyer and Bytzek (2013), we define 'newness' in terms of parties' organizational development rather than the newness of the issues that they represent.
Organizationally new parties still need to build a viable, self-sufficient infrastructure consolidated by a (relatively) stable support base, which makes these parties more vulnerable than and thus distinct from the group of established or 'organizationally mature' parties. They classified parties as new if they are built from scratch ('newly born'), and if they originate from minor splits of established parties. They further included mergers involving 'newly borns' or splits. Successor parties were excluded as well the mergers of old parties that start out from several established party organizations. does not have to be the case. In parties with collective leadership structures we considered as sufficient for discontinuity that one core figure withdraws or is replaced. 11 This avoided a bias in favour of coding discontinuity in centralized, leader-centred parties by requiring in parties with several leadership figures several changes to establish discontinuity rather than just one. Importantly, in line with our theoretical argument we measured discontinuity as such and did not distinguish between changes that resulted from internal crises from a (supposedly) 'regular' or 'neutral' leadership (re)selection or from the simple implementation of a rotation system or incompatibility rules that force party leaders to step back when winning a seat to avoid a concentration of power. This had considerable methodological advantages since the mere occurrence of change can be more reliably coded (especially when covering minor parties that ceased to exist decades ago) than requiring the coders to distinguish 'problematic' leadership discontinuity resulting from some sort of crisis from 'unproblematic' or 'rule-based' discontinuity. While extreme cases such as leaders leaving 10 Depending on the country looked at, this role might be called 'party president' or 'party chairman'. In cases of parties that refused to have a formal leader, we considered the party spokesperson as functionally equivalent role. In the few cases where there were neither leaders nor formal spokespeople we consulted the case study literature regarding who belonged to the core leadership and whether of them withdrew (voluntarily or not) from their prominent role between breakthrough and follow-up election. 11 In the few cases in which parties dissolved even before the follow-up election, we considered this as cases of leadership discontinuity (in fact its complete loss). Similarly, where the party consisted of its leader only holding a single seat, we considered his or her exit before the follow-up election or the decision to run under another label or for another party as indication of discontinuity.
their party in protest (possibly to form a new party of their own) can be easily characterized, the scheduling of a new leadership selection process can be the result of intra-organizational difficulties or can trigger them unintentionally. In cases that did not involve severe, publically displayed infighting, this distinction is not only very clear-cut and making it requires evaluations easily coloured by the party's performance after the new leader took over, leading to circularity when trying to assess the electoral costs of leadership discontinuity. All parties Parties not covered were classified based on Hainsworth (1992) and Betz and Immerfall (1998) . New right parties were coded 1, other parties 0. 30 parties (22.2%) in our sample qualified as new right. Finally, a party takes over government responsibility when it formally participates in government coalitions visible in the taking over of ministerial posts. If parties held one or more ministerial post during their first term in parliament they were coded 1, otherwise they were coded 0. The relevant information was provided by the ParlGov Database (Döring and Manow 2012). 14 parties (10.4%) in our sample took over government responsibility (i.e. held ministries) right after their breakthrough election. entry that presents a genuinely new profile makes it harder for mainstream parties to credibly take over its core issues and win voters back than when being confronted with a party that represents, in principle, old issues but criticises the moderate position of the mainstream 12 Following Taagepera, the most favourable situation for a party to gain at least one seat is when its vote is concentrated in one district. Consequently, for yielding the national threshold of inclusion (TI) the threshold of achieving representation in an average district is divided by the number of districts: TI = (75%/(M+1))/E, with M being the mean district magnitude and E being the number of districts. While this conceptualization of parliamentary threshold might be problematic when characterizing the effects of plurality vs. proportional electoral systems on party system fragmentation more generally, as our sample consists predominantly of very small, short-lived parties that only win a seat -especially in plurality systems -if circumstances are favourable (e.g. they have a concentrated vote), this measure is most suitable for our purposes as it avoids an overestimation of access barriers small parties are confronted with.
II.4 Control Variables
parties or criticizes mainstream parties for neglecting them as compared to other issues in their programme (Lucardie 2000) . Consequently, parties with a distinct offer are expected to be less vulnerable to vote losses. To capture newcomers' relative ideological distinctiveness in their respective party systems, we use a dummy variable based on Abedi's authoritative classification of 'challenger' parties, parties that challenge the status quo in terms of major policy and political system issues (2004: 11-14) . We followed his classification to identify those new parties that qualified as distinct (1). Exceptions were made when parties had been classified as challengers that represented a variety of an ideology already occupied by another (in some cases also new) party in the party system. This was appropriate since unlike Abedi, we attempted to capture distinctiveness relative to the offer provided by competitors at the time of breakthrough. More recent formations in our dataset not covered by Abedi were classified along the same criteria. 50 (37.0%) among our 135 were classified as ideologically distinct. Finally, we control for GDP since economic performance is often considered an important variable that affect the electoral fate of parties. We measured GDP development (in 1 million US dollars per capita) from breakthrough to follow-up election by making use of OECD data 2015 (doi: 10.1787/dc2f7aec-en, accessed on 17 July 2015).
13
For details on all variables see Appendix Table A2 .
III. Method and Findings
Our data includes parties nested within elections nested within countries (76 of the 135 parties in our sample are competing against at least one new party in the same election).
Accordingly, we need a modelling strategy that accounts for the fact that our units of analysis are not independent from each other and enable us to model effects on all three levels (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) . We, therefore, estimate three-way nested random-effect multilevel regression models to explain new party electoral performance after breakthrough.
The relative difference between the percentage of the national vote a party won at the first election after breakthrough and the share it won at its breakthrough election is our dependent variable ((VoteElect2-VoteElect1)/VoteElect1). Table 1 shows the results of our models:
- Table 1 about here -
The findings provide support for three of our five hypotheses, all of which stress the importance of party characteristics helping the party to cope with new challenges. The time for party building a party had before breakthrough has a significant positive effect on its electoral performance after breakthrough as expected by H1. Accordingly, the timing of breakthrough affects whether parliamentary entry is likely to have negative rather than positive repercussions for a party's electoral performance, stressing the need to take into account when a party reaches a qualitatively new stage in its development (Pedersen 1982) .
Similarly, our theoretical expectations were confirmed as far as the role of party origin is concerned (H2): Entrepreneurs perform significantly worse than rooted new formations, which underlines recent findings indicating that rooted formations persist longer as organizations and are more likely to re-enter into parliament (Bolleyer 2013; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013; Beyens et al 2015) . 14 Similarly, leadership discontinuity affects a party' electoral performance negatively (H3) (on a 10% significance level which we deem appropriate due to the low number of cases in the analyses). This finding, however, has to be 14 The importance of societal roots echoes earlier research on the Greens that stressed the importance of their origins in social movements or environmental organizations (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Poguntke 2002). interpreted carefully, since it is less robust than the other significant variables in our model.
15
The finding suggests that leadership discontinuity might be often but not always negative for a new parties' electoral performance after breakthrough. Finally, one of our control variables -GDP -has a positive effect on electoral performance, indicating the importance of the economic situation for parties' electoral fortunes, which enhances confidence in our findings.
Neither belonging to the new right family (H4), immediate government participation (H5) nor any other control variable has a significant effect on our dependent variable. Belang which profit from linkage to nationalist movements (Art 2011) . This is echoed by recent studies on the relative electoral costs government imposes on new right parties which vary with these parties' organizational strategies that assure the functioning of the organization inside and outside public office (Akkermans and de Lange 2012). The absence of a significant effect of immediate government entry has similar implications, namely that government responsibility can be detrimental or beneficial, depending on the party we look at. 16 Even though the functional pressures on new parties clearly increase when taking over such responsibilities and we know that some parties disintegrated as a consequence, some new parties successfully exploited government and benefited from the resources attached to it (Bolleyer et al 2012) . Overall our findings suggest that 'objective' differences in the intensity of functional pressures are less crucial to understand the electoral implications of new parties'
15 Robustness checks regarding the vulnerability of our results to the exclusion of countries showed that both the effects of entrepreneur and time for party building is significant in 16 of 17 regression models, whereas the effect of leadership discontinuity is only significant in eight regression models. 16 Note an interaction between GDP and government responsibility is equally insignificant, while our main variables still remain significant.
national entry than the organizational capacities of a particular party, which are shaped by its origin, the timing of parliamentary entry in a party's life cycle, i.e. the point in its development a party is confronted with new challenges and pressures and the continuity of its leadership.
To assess the real-world meaning of our findings, Table 2 Building, Entrepreneur and Leadership Discontinuity.
- Table 2 about here - Table 2 shows that entrepreneurial new parties lose on average 16.1% of their initial vote share at the next election, while rooted parties gain on average 16.5%. Consequently, the societal origins of parties are crucial for their fade at elections. Furthermore, the time for party building a party had prior to its breakthrough affects their electoral support at the following election and thus whether breakthrough is electorally beneficial or rather damaging: While parties that are less than ten years old tend to lose about 12% of their initial vote share at the next election, whereas older parties tend to win votes. Finally, parties that experience leadership discontinuity lose on average 15% of their initial vote share, while parties with leadership continuity gain on average 8.6%. In comparison, time for party building is thus more important for the electoral performance of a new party after breakthrough than being rooted in societal organizations and not facing leadership discontinuity in its first parliamentary term. Especially the simultaneous relevance of time for party building before breakthrough and party origin is insightful. While rooted parties might have insufficient time to build a strong organization if they enter parliament very early on and might (despite good starting conditions thanks to their links to promoter organizations) suffer electorally, entrepreneurial parties might be able to build up a viable organization prior to entry if breakthrough success does not come too early.
Conclusion and Outlook
Parliamentary entry is a crucial achievement for any new party. After all, most new formations never gain representation in their national parliaments. Yet the electoral consequences of this event are not necessarily beneficial. In this paper we assessed the electoral consequences of entering national parliament for the first time. We presented a party-centred perspective to theorize core factors shaping a) a party's organizational capacity to cope with demands coming with entry and b) the intensity of functional demands a new party is exposed to after its breakthrough. to understand performance patterns, the nature of events and the challenges they pose are less relevant than the relative vulnerability of a party organization exposed to them at the time a particular event occurs. While a range of cross-national studies assess parties' strategic entry into electoral contests (most of which never gain representation) (Hug 2001) , more attention needs to be paid to parties' organizational evolution before they participate successfully in elections and enter parliament, a theme dealt with predominantly by case study research.
Second, and linked to this, we need to learn more about the repercussions of leadership discontinuity, another dimension difficult to study in large-N designs (but see Litton 2015) .
Our findings imply that leadership discontinuity is often but not necessarily negative for a new parties' electoral performance after breakthrough. Indeed, the change of leader might improve a party's image and its functioning if a successor is more popular or skilful than its predecessor. Thus discontinuity can at times constitute a beneficial renewal (Harmel et al 1995: 4) . That said, major changes in political parties such as change of leadership are usually associated with a party suffering heavy defeat (Cross and Blais 2012) . This suggests that if a party changes its leader after a major success such as entering national parliament this (if it is not a mere procedural requirement which is rare) such a step is often linked to some internal difficulty. At the very least our findings imply that change of leadership in crucial stages of party development is likely to be a risky enterprise. Thus, future crossnational work on new party performance needs to explore in greater depth when and how a party manages leadership turnover and how it impacts on a party's evolution in different political settings. And finally, while the (in)stability of leadership can be an important indication of how a party copes during its first legislative term, we still lack appropriate tools to capture the actual parliamentary performance of newcomers across a wider range of parties and political systems as existing measures are tailored to the study of major parties. 17 To develop such measures will be a major challenge. Tables   Table 1: Results Note: Coefficients of linear random-effect multilevel models, standard errors in brackets, levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
